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Abstract
This paper links banking with asset prices in a monetary macroeconomic model. The main
innovation is to consider how falling asset prices aﬀect the banking system through wide-spread
borrower default, while deriving explicit solutions and balance sheet eﬀects even far from the
steady state.
We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of falling asset prices is indirect, non-linear, and involves feedback from
the banking system in the form of credit contraction. When borrowers repay, the eﬀect ‘passes
through’ the bank balance sheet; once borrowers default, asset prices drive bank capital, and
constrained credit in turn drives asset prices. This interaction can explain capital crunches,
ﬁnancial instability, and banking crises, either as fundamental or as self-fulﬁlling outcomes.
This model, unlike others, distinguishes between ﬁnancial and macroeconomic stability, and
makes precise the notion of balance sheet vulnerability. It also sheds some light on the role of
asset prices in monetary policy and carries regulatory implications. The case studies apply the
model to Japan’s Lost Decade, the Nordic Banking Crises, and the US Great Depression.
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The essence of central banking lies in the pursuit of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability.1 There
are complete models of macroeconomic stability, and a reasonably broad consensus on how to
achieve it. Not so for ﬁnancial stability. There is no consensus how to achieve it, nor a widely
accepted model.
This paper studies the relation between asset prices and the banking system. This relation is a
suitable reduction, having been a central element, and a major policy concern, in many episodes of
ﬁnancial instability. To do so requires going beyond existing macroeconomic models in three ways.
First, the model incorporates a banking system that intermediates the payments supporting the
asset market. Second, we allow default and loan losses to aﬀect the banking system. Finally, we
avoid log-linearization to incorporate ﬁnancial extremes far from the steady state.
More precisely, we propose an overlapping-generations model designed for assets to play a central
role, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and for banks to intermediate payments, as in Black (1970)
or McAndrews and Roberds (1999). The model works as follows. Firms purchase productive assets
on bank credit. Next period, they resell them to the new generation of ﬁrms, and sell their output
at the new price level. While undisturbed, the economy remains in steady state.
We then let an adverse productivity shock set oﬀ the dynamics. The forward-looking asset price
falls to reﬂect the reduced return on assets, and old ﬁrms suﬀer an unexpected loss on assets sold.
The resulting wealth eﬀect reduces consumption spending, and the price level falls. Falling prices in
the presence of ﬁxed nominal debt may cause wide-spread default among ﬁrms. If so, the banking
system faces loan losses which, if large, reduce bank capital. A binding capital constraint generates
feedback from the banking system: the contraction of credit in turn depresses asset prices, and
drives up bank loan rates.
Figure 1: Mechanism
















The model’s main appeal is the simplicity with which it articulates these links. In spite of dynamic
general equilibrium, explicit solutions and balance sheet eﬀects are found without resorting to
1Macroeconomic stability refers to the stability of the price level and of output. Financial stability refers to the
smooth, uninterrupted operation of both credit and payment mechanisms (this deﬁnition is from Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis 2002). Central banks supervise, and typically operate, the payment system, including lending of
last resort facilities. They often assume responsibility for the overall stability of the ﬁnancial system, even when the
regulation and supervision of ﬁnancial institutions rests with other authorities. See Fry et al (1999) chapter 6, and
Healey (2001).
1linearization. This is made possible by the overlapping generations structure, and by our inside
money approach to banking.2
We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of falling asset prices on the banking system is indirect, non-linear, and
involves feedback. It is indirect, because banks need not hold the assets to be exposed to falling
asset prices through the default of their borrowers. The eﬀect is non-linear, because small losses
largely ‘pass through’ the bank balance sheet, aﬀecting passive money and credit aggregates. But
larger losses may constrain bank lending [capital crunch], or cause an unstable contraction of credit
[ﬁnancial instability], which propels the system toward insolvency [banking crisis]. At that point,














This appears to be the ﬁrst model to characterize the complete spectrum of outcomes between the
steady state and a systemic banking crisis. The literature has devised separate, mostly microeco-
nomic, models for each range.
The ﬁrst range (‘wealth eﬀects’) is captured by the ﬁnancial accelerator.3 Much empirical evidence
supports the view that balance sheet variables such as cash ﬂow and net worth aﬀect investment
(Hubbard 1998). The ﬁnancial accelerator aggregates these balance sheet eﬀects to produce business
cycle dynamics. The role of asset prices is emphasized in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke and
Gertler (1999), and Chen (2001). Our model diﬀers in several respects. While sharing the emphasis
on balance sheets in a macroeconomic context, our model is more basic about borrowers (credit
demand), but incorporates a banking system (credit supply). Second, the ﬁnancial accelerator
is about borrowers’ investment, output and, ultimately, macroeconomic stability.4 By contrast,
our model focuses on ﬁnancial stability, and the way loan losses may interrupt the intermediation
of credit and payments. Third, the ﬁnancial accelerator conﬁnes itself to small deviations from
steady state, and thereby excludes the ﬁnancial extremes that had motivated its development.
The narratives of Bernanke (1983), Mishkin (1991, 1999), and Calomiris (1993, 1995) emphasized
that falling asset values can impair borrowers’ balance sheets to the point of interrupting the
2This approach is considerably simpler than the alternatives in monetary economics, because the credit apparatus
is frictionless until bank capitalization interferes with the elastic provision of credit. It has the further advantage
of being consistent with basic payment system facts, and with the determination of the money supply by credit
counterparts.
3The main contributions are Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990, 1999), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
4This becomes clear in how Bernanke and Gertler (1990) describe ‘ﬁnancial fragility’. Another indication is the
treatment of default. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) restrict contracts to rule out default. Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999) allow default, but make it inconsequential to diversiﬁed lenders. The spread paid by successful ﬁrms
compensates for any loan losses from defaulting ﬁrms (and aggregate risk is oﬀset by state-contingent loan rates).
2intermediation of credit, which in turn exacerbates macroeconomic conditions. This feedback is
incorporated in our model. Hence, compared with the ﬁnancial accelerator, our model allows
wide-spread default to aﬀect the banking system hence credit supply.
The second range in ﬁgure 2 ends with a capital crunch. In spite of abundant empirical evidence
from New England and Japan, few models address this problem. They provide better micro-
foundations for bank capital but a poorer treatment of loan losses than does our model. Some
papers take falling bank capital as exogenous (Bernanke and Gertler 1987, Holmstr¨ om and Ti-
role 1997, and Chen 2001), or as unrelated to loan losses (Blum and Hellwig 1995, Gorton and
Winton 2000, Freixas and Bolton 2001). Others do consider loan losses, but do not relate them to
any borrowers (Rajan 1994, van den Heuvel 2002), or to any endogenous macroeconomic variables
(Gersbach 2002). In contrast to capital crunch models, our paper endogenizes loan losses within a
macroeconomic framework.
The ﬁnal range in the diagram ends with a banking crisis. Compared with existing models, ours
emphasizes the deterioration of bank assets in a macroeconomic context. Banking crises have
almost exclusively been analyzed in terms of the microeconomics of bank runs. A vast literature
builds on the idea that liquidity-providing demand deposits make banks prone to runs: the existence
and fragility of banks are then simultaneously explained, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Allen
and Gale (1998), or Diamond and Rajan (2001).5 This literature takes bank assets and their
deterioration as exogenous. In contrast to bank run models, our paper provides an asset-based
explanation of banking distress. In taking a macroeconomic approach, we link bank assets to ﬁrms,
and ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial position to macroeconomic conditions.
We think this perspective has several advantages. The deterioration of bank assets through non-
performing loans is characteristic of banking distress, as becomes clear from the 168 banking crises
compiled by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). Importantly, a banking system can be in distress even
when bank runs are not a problem.6 This was the case during Japan’s Lost Decade and the Nordic
Banking Crises which are discussed as case studies. Even the classic banking panics of the Great
Depression are being revised in the light of new evidence on the fundamental deterioration of bank
assets. We argue that bank runs are perhaps better viewed as a symptom, rather than the cause,
of ﬁnancial instability.
Some aspects of the model are perhaps of policy interest. First, this model, unlike others, distin-
guishes between ﬁnancial and macroeconomic stability, which provides a new perspective on the
role of asset prices in monetary policy. Second, the model has regulatory implications. Restric-
tions on direct asset holding would not eliminate banks’ eﬀective exposure to asset prices; and the
model produces ﬁnancial instability as an extreme form of procyclicality. Finally, the interaction of
credit, asset prices, and loan losses provides a uniﬁed approach for explaining ﬁnancial extremes.
This approach allows to express ‘balance sheet vulnerability’ in terms of structural features of the
5Useful surveys appear in Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Freixas and Rochet (1997).
6The last systemic banking panics in the US and UK took place in 1933 and 1866, respectively. Deposit insurance
and lending of last resort are almost universal today.
3economy, and relate each outcome to an explicit critical threshold.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the basic model in perfect foresight. Section 2
studies the eﬀect of a shock on prices, borrowers, and on the banking system. Section 3 considers
the feedback from the banking system to credit, asset prices and the loan rate. Finally, section 4
discusses policy implications, and section 5 presents the case studies.
1 The Basic Model
The model is a ﬂexible-price general equilibrium model with real assets and consumption goods.
There are overlapping generations of ﬁrms and households, each of unit measure.7 Households are
the lenders in this economy, solving a standard intertemporal consumption problem; their Euler
equation, along with goods market clearing, will govern the price level. Firms use real assets to
produce and sell consumption goods; the productivity of their technology, along with future price
levels, will determine the value of assets. The banking system arises to help households and ﬁrms
attain their optimal pattern of exchange by intermediating their payments.8
1.1 Firms
The typical ﬁrm of generation t−1 buys assets ht−1, such as real estate, and uses them to produce
f(ht−1) consumption goods. Next period, the goods are sold at the price level pt, and assets are
resold, undepreciated, at the asset price qt. Firms are run by owner-entrepreneurs, who maximize









qt−1ht−1 = bt−1 (1)
Πt + Rt−1bt−1 = ptf (ht−1) + qtht−1.
Firms enjoy limited liability and earn positive proﬁts.9 The ﬁnal two lines are the period budget
constraints in the absence of a rental market: ﬁrms borrow the full value of assets before production
takes place, and repay their debt with interest (R > 1) after selling output and assets.10 The ﬁrst-
7Firms are treated as overlapping generations for greater analytical tractability in the presence of default. House-
holds are treated as inﬁnitely-lived, assuming an operative bequest motive.
8Firms and banks are modeled as separate from households, consuming their proﬁts and dividends, respectively.
This simple ownership structure makes sure that (a) borrowing takes place, and that (b) loan losses and bank capital
structure matter. This would not necessarily be so if (a) ﬁrms were owned by households (production and consumption
would be internalized), or if (b) banks were owned by ﬁrms or by households.
9We allow for positive proﬁts because zero proﬁts would make ﬁrms too prone to default. They can be understood
as an implicit wage for the entrepreneur’s speciﬁc labor, subsumed in the production function.
10If assets were rented and paid for after use, there would be no need for borrowing and no debt in equilibrium; ﬁrms
would ﬁnance their holding of assets entirely out of sales revenue. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) also rule out renting.
4order condition equates the marginal revenue product to the user cost of holding assets,
ptf0(hd
t−1) = Rt−1qt−1 − qt. (2)
The user cost is a small fraction of the purchasing price qt−1 because assets, unlike goods, can be
resold after use. This gives ﬁrms an incentive to become leveraged.
1.2 Households
Alongside ﬁrms, there are inﬁnitely-lived households who derive utility from consuming goods.
They are endowed at date 0 with a ﬁxed supply H of productive assets. They could run their own
production, with g(h) ≤ εf(h), where ε > 0 is small, and g0(0) < f0(H). Households therefore have
little productive use for assets; they will sell them to the ﬁrst generation of ﬁrms.11 Households







s0 + D0 = q0H (3)
st + Dt = Rt−1Dt−1 ∀t ≥ 1,
where st ≡ ptch
t denotes their spending on consumption, and Dt their wealth carried over. The
slope of optimal consumption is given by the Euler equation,
u0(ch





In steady state it must be the case that R = β−1, the interest rate equals the inverse rate of time
preference. Optimal consumption spending then equals s = (R−1)D, the permanent income from
wealth D = qH/R. To specify how households deviate from this perpetuity rule outside steady
state, we posit time-separable CRRA utility u(c) = c1−γ−1
1−γ , and specify a process for the nominal
interest rate Rt.
1.3 The Banking System
Households are the lenders in this economy – they will never run down their wealth (u0(0) = ∞).
Firms are borrowers each period, since production takes time. To achieve eﬃcient intertemporal
exchange, the assets must be passed down successive generations of ﬁrms, in exchange for (part of)
the output produced with assets,
An incomplete contracts approach indicates that ownership dominates renting when the entrepreneur’s human capital
is essential (Hart 1995, chapter 2).
11Since households do not rent them out, they would only use assets in equilibrium if these appreciated at (close
to) the rate of interest; but a user cost of zero is inconsistent with ﬁrms’ ﬁnite demand necessary for equilibrium.
Households run their own production only if intertemporal exchange breaks down (autarky).
5Figure 3: Intertemporal Exchange
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Accomplishing all necessary payments with private liabilities would pose a formidable challenge, as
doing so requires the collection and clearing of an inﬁnity of IOUs within and across generations.
Moreover, to be accepted as means of payment, private agents’ IOUs must be enforceable.
In this context we motivate banking as a payment mechanism. Entrepreneurs need a means of
payment for purchasing assets and output of other ﬁrms. Circulating media (cash, bank notes, or
IOUs) are liable to the incentive for strategic default inherent in (1). By contrast, the transfer of
deposits requires intermediation and allows the banking system to take advantage of its place in
the payment system to block payments from ﬁrms that have not repaid their debt. This makes
debt enforceable.12 In contrast to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), borrowing is not constrained by the
future market value of assets: ﬁrms can also pledge their future sales revenue in (1).
The banking system interposes its liability to facilitate the clearing of private debt as follows.
Every period t, it creates deposits worth qtht for new ﬁrms, enabling them to purchase assets by
transferring deposits to old ﬁrms. Old ﬁrms use these deposits to reduce their existing debt with the
bank to (Rt−1qt−1 − qt)ht−1. This balance is repaid using sales revenue ptf (ht−1), leaving proﬁts
consistent with (1).13 Going backward, the ﬁrst payment q0H is received by the initial sellers of
assets (households), who hold their wealth on deposit to ﬁnance their spending st every period.
The bank balance sheet, recorded at the close of markets each period, consists of loans, deposits,
and capital,
A Bank Balance Sheet L
qtH Dt
Kt.
12Consistent with this view, Mester et al (2003) provide evidence that banks use the payments information available
through their checking accounts to better monitor borrowers.
13The banking system interposing itself as a counterparty to all transactions substantially simpliﬁes clearing and
settlement, because it is conducted in terms of a single liability rather than an inﬁnity of agents’ IOUs.
6Note that the size of the bank balance sheet at all times equals the value of the asset market qtH;
this correspondence is natural in an economy whose asset market relies on bank credit.14 The
banking system starts with K = s0 worth of bank capital.15 Competitive behavior leads to a
zero spread between lending and deposit rates, so bank capital evolves as Kt = Rt−1Kt−1 − Divt.
Suppose the banking system follows the simple dividend policy of paying out its proﬁts if positive,16
Divt = (Rt−1 − 1)Kt−1. (5)
Hence bank capital remains constant at Kt = K in the absence of loan losses.
Remarks on Banking. Our approach to banking has some features worth commenting on. In
other overlapping generations models, outside money (Samuelson 1958), bank notes (Champ et
al 1996), or private IOUs (Sargent and Wallace 1982) serve as means of payment – here bank
deposits do. This is only sensible, and consistent with basic payment system facts.17 Second, by
granting credit, the banking system creates inside money by counterpart. Treating the banking sys-
tem as a passive balance sheet allows the quantity of money and credit to be demand-determined.
This notion of ‘elastic credit’ relates to several (mostly older) strands of the monetary literature.18
Here it provides analytical simplicity in separating the eﬀect on, and feedback from, the banking
system (see page 17). Third, the deposits created as a means of payment end up being held across
periods – the banking system combines the functions of payment system and credit intermedi-
ary. Hence the stability of the banking system is equivalent to ﬁnancial stability (as deﬁned in
footnote 1).
14It is foreseeable that any constraint on the size of the bank balance sheet, such as low bank capital, will reduce
credit availability and thereby depress asset prices.
15Bankers are endowed with goods. Since ﬁrms only start selling their production at date 1, households spend s0
of their deposits to purchase αβy of bank endowment. The banking system thereby acquires a deposit claim on itself
which constitutes bank capital, worth p0αβy. (This simply states that to become bank owners they must initially
give up some consumption. See Gorton and Winton 1995 on a more elaborate period-zero analysis.)
16Such a policy would be necessary in steady state for bank capital to remain constant.
17McAndrews and Roberds (1999) identify payment intermediation as the original, and still vital, function of banks.
Cash transactions today account for less than 1% of the value of payments in the US (Hancock and Humphrey 1998).
Nevertheless, macroeconomic models almost exclusively work with cash. Similarly, contemporary banking theory
(following Diamond and Dybvig 1983, or Diamond 1984) does not view deposits as a means of payment (McAndrews
and Roberds 1995, 1999, and Skeie 2004 are exceptions).
18Goodhart emphasizes that bank credit, in reality, is made elastic by institutional construction, because central
banks guarantee access to reserves at the chosen oﬃcial short-term rate, which in turn allows commercial banks to
make loans freely available to qualiﬁed borrowers (e.g. Goodhart 2003, p. 1). Elastic credit is a common theme in
several strands of the monetary literature, including the Banking School (19th century), central banking and credit
cycles (Thornton 1802, Bagehot 1873, Hawtrey 1919), pure credit economy (Wicksell 1907), inside money (Gurley
and Shaw 1960, chapter 7), free banking (Selgin 1988), and post-Keynesian economics (Moore 1988). Hicks (1967,
1989 chapters 5-7), and Black (1970) describe a credit economy with banking similar to ours. Few formal models,
however, identify elastic credit with banking; they include work on overdrafts (McAndrews and Roberds 1999), on
private bank note issue (Champ et al. 1996), and on payment systems (McAndrews and Roberds 1995, Freeman 1996
and Green 1997).
71.4 Perfect Foresight Equilibrium
A perfect foresight equilibrium is a sequence of endogenous prices {pt,qt,Rt}∞
t=0, and choices
{ht,st,Πt+1,Divt+1}∞
t=0, such that ﬁrms maximize (1), households maximize (3), the banking sys-
tem follows (5), and the asset and goods markets clear every period. Clearly, a steady state with
stable prices requires that the nominal interest rate in (4) equal R = β−1, the natural rate. For
simplicity, we assume that the banking system lends and borrows at this rate also outside the
steady state.19
Asset market equilibrium. All ﬁrms have identical technologies and face the same prices; hence
all choose hd
t−1 given in (2), which therefore represents aggregate asset demand. Demand has this
form every period from 0 onward. Assets are in ﬁxed supply H and do not depreciate. Hence
market clearing requires
hd
t = (f0)−1 ([Rqt − qt+1]/pt+1) = H.
Inverting this expression allows to relate the user cost of holding assets to the future price level,
(Rqt − qt+1)H = αpt+1y, (6)
where y ≡ f(H) is aggregate output, and α ≡ f0(H)H
y is output elasticity.20 In equilibrium, ﬁrms




t = (1 − α)pty. (7)














The value of assets is the present value of marginal revenue products associated with their use.
Goods market equilibrium. The goods market clears when aggregate supply equals aggregate
demand, the sum of spending by households, ﬁrms’ proﬁts and bank dividends, pty = st+Πt+Divt.
After using (5) and (7),
st = αpty − (R − 1)K ∀t ≥ 1 (9)
s0 = αβy (p0 = 1).
Successive goods market clearing conditions are connected by the Euler equations (4), which sim-
19Woodford (2003) discusses other ways of dividing the real rate into Rt and pt/pt+1. Our assumption is weakened
in section 3. As interest rate rules are not the subject of this paper, we assume a ﬁxed rate and dispense with nominal
price level indeterminacy by imposing p0 = 1. Doing so is no more arbitrary than the common assumption of a ﬁxed
quantity of unbacked ﬁat money in other models (see footnote 22).
20As H is constant, so is α. Clearly α ∈ [0,1]; we impose the weak condition α > (R − 1) as a lower bound on the









Hence a perfect foresight equilibrium is a sequence of endogenous prices that satisfy (6), (9),
and (10), for all t ≥ 0, given H, K = s0, R = β−1, and p0 = 1.
Proposition 1 Basic Economy
(a) The perfect foresight equilibrium is unique and stationary.
(b) Firms and the banking system are leveraged.
Proof: Substituting st and st+1 into (10) yields an expression of the form g(pt) = g (pt+1), which
implies pt+1 = pt = p, ∀t ≥ 0.21 Going backward, the price level remains constant at p0 = 1. So






t=0 also remain constant.22 Regarding part (b), we express leverage as
debt over net worth. For ﬁrms, this is RqH over proﬁts (1 − α)py. For the banking system, it is











Both ﬁrms and the banking system are leveraged. 
The economy remains in steady state because the world looks identical looking forward from any t.
Firms are leveraged because they purchase and resell durable assets whose value exceeds output.
While this is similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the present model also contains a banking
system. Characteristically, the banking system is highly leveraged as it intermediates a large value
of credit and payments.
2 Eﬀect on the Banking System
Along a perfect foresight equilibrium there can be no ﬁnancial distress. We now drop the perfect
foresight assumption to study the consequences of a shock relative to this benchmark. Suppose
21The function g is increasing, for g
0 (pt) has the sign of (st + γ(R − 1)K)/pt > 0, since st ≥ 0.
22The normalization p0 = 1 can be justiﬁed by a reserve requirement: a central bank can create and lend (non-
circulating) reserves to the banking system, to be held on deposit with the central bank. An exogenously supplied
quantity of reserves then limits deposits, hence bank assets. Since qH and p are related by (11), the reserve requirement
can be chosen to imply p = 1. Skeie (2004) instead determines p = 1 by means of a central bank exchanging goods.
Alternatively, the ﬁscal theory of the price level could be invoked to pin down p0, see Woodford (1995).
9an unexpected productivity shock permanently reduces total factor productivity from t onward by
τ ∈ [0,1].23 The production technology becomes y+1 = (1 − τ)f(h). This experiment allows us
to study the eﬀect of falling asset prices on the banking system. In contrast to the fundamental
equilibrium considered here, the self-fulﬁlling equilibria of the next section, where {pt+i,qt+i}
∞
i=0
take values independent of τ, are entirely due to the feedback from the banking system to asset
prices.
2.1 Reactions to a Shock
(1) New ﬁrms (entering in t) pay less for assets, because assets are now less productive. The
ﬁrst-order condition (2) now reads
pt+1 (1 − τ)f0(hd
t) = Rqt − qt+1. (14)
The same condition applies to subsequent generations, with subscripts forwarded accordingly.
(2) Old ﬁrms face the threat of debt-deﬂation.24 In t − 1 they had borrowed qH, assuming that
in t they would sell goods and assets at continued steady state prices {1,q}. (Their production y
remains unaﬀected by the shock, because it was carried out during t−1.) Their budget constraint (1)
ex post becomes
Πt + (RqH − λ) = pty + qtH. (15)
Debt is predetermined, but the ability to repay, on the right, is not. If it falls short of debt, the
diﬀerence is transferred as a non-performing loan to the banking system,
λ = max{0,RqH − (pty + qtH)}. (16)
This is how limited liability in (1) prevents Πt = ptc
f
t from turning negative. An equivalent expres-
sion for non-performing loans is λ = max{0,ω − Π}, which compares ﬁrms’ ability to withstand
unexpected losses, Π, with total losses
ω ≡ δqH + (1 − pt)y. (17)
Total losses consist of the proportional decline in asset values (δ ≡
q−qt
q ), plus the loss of sales
revenue to deﬂation (1 − pt).25
23There are no further shocks after t. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Allen and Gale (2000) also assume zero-
probability shocks. Note that the results are not speciﬁc to productivity shocks; a redistribution from ﬁrms to
households, for instance, has similar eﬀects. We assume a zero-probability shock because fully stochastic models make
explicit solutions diﬃcult to obtain. Zero-probability shocks are also used in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Allen
and Gale (2000) who discuss why a suﬃciently small probability of a shock will not change results. More generally,
the history of ﬁnancial crises is littered with events nobody appears to have expected, see Kindleberger (1996).
24See von Peter (2004) for a theory of debt-deﬂation in the spirit of Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1982).
25Before t, the economy was still in steady state (qt−1 = q). Hence δ measures the decline both relative to steady
state, and relative to last period.
10(3) The banking system must write oﬀ non-performing loans if ﬁrms default, as soon as losses
become certain in t. Entering t, the banking system would normally earn (R − 1)K on capital. In
keeping with the policy of paying out proﬁts, dividend payout is reduced by loan losses. However,
we assume that the banking system issues no new equity (no negative dividends).26 Hence when
loan losses are large, dividends become zero and bank capital falls by λ − (R − 1)K.
Kt = Divt = case
K (R − 1)K − λ if λ ≤ (R − 1)K
RK − λ 0 if λ ≥ (R − 1)K.
(18)
Thereafter, the simple dividend policy makes both future dividends and capital remain constant,
Divt+i = (R − 1)Kt+i, and Kt+i = Kt.
2.2 Fundamental Equilibrium
We now aggregate agents’ reactions to determine the new equilibrium prices for goods and assets,
{pt+i(τ),qt+i(τ)}
∞
i=0. Equilibrium following the shock is deﬁned as on page 8.
Asset market equilibrium. Proceeding as before, (14) alters (6) and (7) to reﬂect that the shock
reduces the output of new and future ﬁrms,
(Rqt − qt+1)H = α(1 − τ)pt+1y,
Πt+1 = (1 − α)(1 − τ)pt+1y. (19)
Subsequent asset markets are of the same form.
Goods market equilibrium. Clearing again requires that aggregate demand equal supply. The
possibility of default makes aggregate spending inherit the case structure from (16) and (18),
pty =
(
st + [pty + qtH − RqH + λ] + (R − 1)K − λ if λ ≤ (R − 1)K
st if λ ≥ (R − 1)K.
(20)
The ﬁrst equation applies when loan losses remain small. One observes a wealth eﬀect: the lower
pt and qt, the lower aggregate spending. Once ﬁrms’ proﬁts are zero, further losses aﬀect aggregate
demand through reduced bank dividends, until they too are zero. Once that happens, the second
line applies: only households continue spending.27
Goods market clearing in t + 1 equates the value of (reduced) output with the sum of household
26Evidence suggests that banks ﬁnd it diﬃcult to raise equity when sustaining losses. The assumption is less
objectionable here than in the context of Rochet (1992) or van den Heuvel (2002). Models incorporating costs of
issuing bank capital include Gorton and Winton (1995), and Bolton and Freixas (2001).
27The case λ > RK need not be addressed separately, because losses borne by depositors, λ−RK, aﬀect aggregate
demand through reduced st+i in the same way as Divt+i < 0 would.
11spending, new ﬁrms’ proﬁts (19), and bank dividends,
(1 − τ)pt+1y = st+1 + (1 − α)(1 − τ)pt+1y + (R − 1)Kt. (21)
Subsequent goods markets are of the same form, but with Kt+i = Kt. Combining (20)-(21) with
the Euler equations (10) completes goods market equilibrium. With high intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (γ < 1), households spend more when goods are cheap. We focus on this case, for
which the model admits a well-deﬁned ﬁxed-price limit as γ → 0.28 We now show that prices fall
when fundamentals deteriorate (proposition 2); in the presence of ﬁxed nominal debt this leads to
deteriorating balance sheets (proposition 3).
Proposition 2 Falling Prices
(a) The new steady state is reached in t + 1, the period after the shock.
(b) Relative to steady state, worse fundamentals (a greater shock τ) cause
• greater asset price decline: δ0 (τ) > 0,
• greater deﬂation: p0
t (τ) ≤ 0.
Proof: Appendix 1 completes the argument that follows. 
The short-lived dynamics are due to the overlapping-generations structure. Old ﬁrms exit, whether
or not they default, and persistence is conﬁned to bank capital. Thereafter, agents again correctly
anticipate future prices when they incur debt, and the economy reverts to a perfect foresight
equilibrium for which a unique steady state was shown to exist.
The asset price falls because the shock reduces the productivity with which assets are used. Solv-
ing (19) forward and inserting the new steady state price level pt+1 (τ), one ﬁnds










Comparing with (11) shows that the fundamental asset price decline equals
δ(τ) = τpt+1 + (1 − pt+1) > 0 ∀ τ > 0. (22)
This decline produces a wealth eﬀect, because old ﬁrms’ proﬁts are a component of aggregate
demand. The goods market (20) simpliﬁes to








Equilibrium requires households’ extra spending (st − s) to oﬀset the wealth eﬀect δ(τ)qH, and the
price level falls to attract such extra spending (γ < 1). Since deﬂation lowers sales revenue and
28The main eﬀect of γ > 1 would be to reverse the pattern of price level movements, and deepen the asset price
decline in proposition 2. See also footnote 39.
12ﬁrms’ spending in (20), the fall in aggregate demand is consistent with pt(τ) < 1. Deﬂation in this
model is temporary, however, and its extent is limited. It is temporary because households’ budget
constraint implies that the price level pt+1 (τ) reverts to slightly above p = 1 (see appendix 1).
Since st exceeds permanent income s, st+1 must fall below s to ensure that households do not
overspend. The price level movements implement this pattern of equilibrium spending. Deﬂation
is also limited because the wealth eﬀect in (20) acts on proﬁts and bank dividends only; it ceases to
operate when these are zero. At that point aggregate demand and the price level reach a minimum,
pt = (R/α)
−γ < 1
st = pty = s(R/α)1−γ. (24)
Proposition 3 Deteriorating Balance Sheets
(a) Total losses ω (τ) and loan losses λ(τ) are monotonically increasing in τ.
(b) Small losses are borne by ﬁrms; larger losses are shared. The space of fundamentals [0,1]
splits into four ranges, delimited by thresholds {τi,δi,λi}, according to how losses are borne.
(c) On the bank balance sheet, reduced credit is matched by
• monetary contraction for any τ > 0, and
• falling capital for τ > τDiv only.
Proof: That losses are increasing follows directly from proposition 2. The nature of standard debt,
and limited ability to absorb losses, together imply that losses are borne hierarchically. Explicit
thresholds {τi,δi} are derived in appendix 2. 










































Figure 4 illustrates how falling prices translate into deteriorating balance sheets, as measured by
λ and ω. Firms’ ability to repay, given in (15), decreases when goods and asset prices fall. In
13steady state, py +qH covers RqH, leaving Π in proﬁts (the double vertical line). As prices fall, so
do proﬁts Πt. Firms repay in full while they can. When prices fall below the default point, ﬁrms
default on λ and proﬁts remain at zero.
This convex payoﬀ proﬁle is typical for limited liability ﬁrms, and is often used for options pricing
of corporate debt, following Merton (1974). Here, we focus on how ﬁrms’ losses spill over to the
banking system. Losses ‘cascade’ down the debt structure.29 Each transition is marked by a
threshold i; each threshold can be expressed equivalently as τi, δi, or λi, since the mapping from
fundamentals to outcomes is unique.
Figure 5: Deteriorating Balance Sheets
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• When τ < τ0, the asset price decline is too small to cause default. Losses are borne by ﬁrms as
proﬁts fall from Π to Πt. (Most macroeconomic models are only concerned with this range.)
• When τ > τ0, ﬁrms default and pass on further losses as non-performing loans λ. Over this
second range, the banking system absorbs loan losses by reducing its dividend payout.
• When τ > τDiv, loan losses exceed normal bank proﬁts, λ > (R − 1)K, and the diﬀerence is
written oﬀ bank capital.
• Finally, when τ > τK, loan losses eliminate bank capital, Kt ≤ 0. The banking system is
insolvent, and losses are ultimately borne by depositors.
The eﬀect of falling asset prices on the banking system can now be examined by looking at all
components of its balance sheet. Clearly, as fundamentals deteriorate, credit demand falls since
new ﬁrms borrow less money for purchasing less-valued assets (qtH < qH). Credit demand is
accommodated at R and the size of the banking system endogenously shrinks. But if bank assets
contract, so must liabilities. Figure 6 demonstrates the mechanics, given that the banking system
intermediates all payments made in this inside money economy.
29This expression evokes Minsky’s work, in which debt structure plays a central role. See Minsky (1982b) on
debt-deﬂation, and the essays in Minsky (1982a) on the ﬁnancial instability hypothesis.
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Entering period t, balance sheet t− reﬂects loans and deposits with interest due. While markets
are open during t, four transactions occur:
(1) new ﬁrms borrow qtH and spend the deposits so obtained on old ﬁrms’ assets,
(2) savers spend st of their deposits on old ﬁrms’ output,
(3) the banking system spends Divt on output. Through (1)-(3), old ﬁrms accumulate deposits
worth qtH + st + Divt, and
(4) loan losses, if positive, are written oﬀ by subtracting λ from both loans and bank capital.
The accumulated deposits in (3) repay the performing portion of loans, cancelling RqH − λ
on both sides of t.30 This yields balance sheet t+, which is carried over to period t + 1.
Now proposition 2 gives the equilibrium prices at which these transactions occur. Both bank capital
and deposits depend on the asset price decline. Hence balance sheet t+ shows how reduced credit
is matched by monetary contraction and falling bank capital.
Monetary contraction. For τ < τDiv, loan losses are small and bank capital remains constant
(RK − λ − Divt = K). Hence deposits must fall to match the decline in credit. This is consistent
with increased spending by households, st > s found in (23),
Dt = RD − st = D − δqH.
The spending st that clears the goods market also reduces deposits in just the right measure. (This
link reﬂects the consistency of market equilibrium with the bank balance sheet.) Since deposits
are the means of payment, a monetary contraction is taking place: the extra spending received by
ﬁrms is applied toward repaying debt, ‘extinguishing’ more loans and deposits than was the case
in steady state.31
Falling bank capital. For τ > τDiv (hence δ > δDiv), loan losses exceed bank proﬁts, so any
further losses hit bank capital (while Dt = RD − st). As the price level stops its decline at
30The equality uses (18) and (20), and holds for any λ ≥ 0.
31The model is consistent with the ‘credit counterparts’ determination of the money supply: inside money expands
by loan extension, and contracts by loan repayment. This principle informs the analysis of monetary aggregates,
especially in the UK. From this perspective one might question Friedman’s claim that people cannot in aggregate
succeed in reducing nominal balances, because “One man’s expenditures are another’s receipts.” (Friedman 1970,
p. 195).
15pt(τDiv) = pt, loan losses beyond (R − 1)K are entirely due to asset price declines beyond δDiv,
K − Kt = λ(τ) − (R − 1)K = [δ (τ) − δDiv]qH. (25)
This one-to-one relation between asset prices and bank capital is remarkable, since the banking
system holds no marketable assets – its exposure to asset prices is entirely indirect, through its
borrowers’ default.32
Expression (25) also shows that normal proﬁts serve as a buﬀer: capital falls only to the extent
that loan losses exceed normal proﬁts. The banking system turns insolvent (Kt = 0) when the
asset price falls by δK and loan losses reach λ = RK. Even larger fundamental shocks than τK are
conceivable, whereupon depositors start taking losses of λ − RK. At the extreme τ → 1, assets
lose their productive use, their price collapses to zero, so does credit demand, and deposits are
engulfed by negative net worth (δ(1) = 1, qtH = 0; Kt = −Dt). The banking system seizes the
assets from defaulting ﬁrms, and households repossess H instead of their deposits. The collapse
of the banking system destroys the payment mechanism that had enabled ﬁrms and households to
produce and allocate resources eﬃciently; the economy degenerates to autarky, where households
produce output g(H) ≤ εy (see page 5).33
We have now covered the fundamental equilibrium for all possible shocks τ ∈ [0,1], spanning the
entire space between steady state and systemic banking crisis. The eﬀect of falling asset prices
on the banking system can be summarized as indirect and non-linear. While deposits match the
decline in credit, the eﬀect “passes through” the balance sheet; but once the asset price decline
exceeds the threshold δDiv, bank capital falls in parallel with asset prices, even though the banking
system holds none of the assets.
32Put diﬀerently, loss-given-default (LGD) depends on the performance of collateral (the asset price). In the
presence of uncertainty one would say the banking system is exposed to market risk via credit risk.
33Until the banking system collapses, the real eﬀects in our model are distributional: when ﬁrms default, their
owners consume nothing. Output eﬀects would set in earlier if we had incorporated credit-constrained producers, as
do Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
163 Feedback from the Banking System
So far, lending behavior did not change as bank capital fell: credit demand was always accom-
modated at R. This meant that asset prices and credit were driving money and bank capital;
our elastic credit speciﬁcation allowed us to examine this direction of causality without any of the
feedback that would arise if credit were not perfectly elastic.
Yet when bank capital fell one-for-one with credit in (25), the capital-asset ratio fell rapidly as
the shock approached τK. Banks in reality are not indiﬀerent to their capital-asset ratio, be it for
reasons of regulation, market discipline, or risk management. We account for this possibility by
introducing a capital constraint. This allows us to address separately how the state of the banking
system feeds back onto asset prices.
3.1 Capital-Constrained Equilibrium
Suppose the banking system maintains a minimum capital-asset ratio of (R − 1)/R, the steady
state ratio.34 This constraint introduces two new considerations. First, credit supply may become








qH if λ ≤ (R − 1)K
qH − R
R−1 [λ − (R − 1)K] if (R − 1)K ≤ λ ≤ RK
0 if λ ≥ RK.
(26)
where we have used (25) along with the restriction that bank assets cannot be negative. Second, if
credit is capital-constrained, so are asset prices. Hence the asset pricing equation (8) now determines








We call this credit-constrained asset pricing: viewing (27) as an asset pricing equation, the loan
rate Rt > R discounts the market’s forward-looking asset valuation down to the constrained asset
price. Equivalently, viewing (27) as credit demand, the loan rate rises to bring credit demand down
to capital-constrained credit supply (26).35
A capital-constrained equilibrium is a set of endogenous variables {pt+i,qt+i,Rt+i}
∞
i=0 that satisﬁes
the capital constraint (26), and the equilibrium conditions of the goods market (20)-(21) and the
asset market (27), hence the credit market. The main feature of such an equilibrium is that the
asset price qt (hence δ) is now determined by the capital constraint. This constraint depends on
loan losses, which in turn depend on the asset price decline and on structural parameters.
34The debt-capital ratio in (13) corresponds to an asset-capital ratio of R/(R − 1).
35Firms spend a certain amount on the total cost of borrowing in (19); raising the price of credit eﬀectively reduces
the size of the loans they can aﬀord.
173.2 Financial Extremes
We now show how feedback from banking to asset prices may lead to ﬁnancial instability and
self-fulﬁlling equilibria.
Proposition 4 Capital Crunches, Financial Instability, and Banking Crises
(a) For good fundamentals (τ ≤ τ∗),
• the fundamental equilibrium is as before, but
• self-fulﬁlling capital crunches and banking crises are also possible.
(b) For poor fundamentals (τ > τ∗),
• the only equilibrium is a systemic banking crisis, and
• ﬁnancial instability drives the system toward systemic banking crisis.
(c) Financial instability results from the two-way interaction between banking and asset prices
when their decline exceeds a threshold δ∗.
Proof: Appendix 3. 
These results are best explained graphically. Figure 7 plots credit demand and bank capital against
the asset price decline δ.
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The thick lines represent the capital constraint (26). It never binds while bank capital remains
intact, because credit demand qtH falls short of admissible lending qH. However, once capital
falls, admissible lending declines very steeply: to keep bank leverage constant, each loan loss must
18be met with a R/(R − 1) -fold contraction of credit. Appendix 3 shows that the constraint binds
once the asset price decline reaches the threshold






At this point a capital crunch sets in. The space of fundamentals is now split around the threshold τ∗
that makes δ∗ a fundamental decline.
Good fundamentals (τ ≤ τ∗). (τ ≤ τ∗). The fundamental valuation of assets in (22) would
imply that the capital constraint does not bind (δ(τ) < δ∗); hence the fundamental equilibrium
of section 2 remains an equilibrium. But self-fulﬁlling credit crunches and banking crises are also
possible: the capital constraint binds whenever δ ≥ δ∗, whether or not this decline is driven by
fundamentals. Figure 7 shows the ﬁxed points of (26) where credit contraction and asset price
decline are mutually consistent.36 The capital crunch (δ = δ∗) and the banking crisis (δ = 1) are
the two self-fulﬁlling equilibria where the asset price decline generates exactly the measure of loan
losses λ(δ) that forces bank lending to contract by δ percent.37 This may happen even as τ → 0,
because the system can always jump to a constrained asset price – the mapping from fundamentals
to outcomes is no longer unique. Associated with self-fulﬁlling equilibria is a jump decline in goods
and asset prices, and an interest rate spread due to credit-constrained asset pricing (see appendix 3).
The stronger fundamentals, the greater the spread required to bring strong credit demand down to
constrained credit supply.
Poor fundamentals (τ > τ∗). When the shock is large, δ (τ) necessarily exceeds δ∗ and the
capital constraint binds. Financial instability then propels the system toward a systemic banking
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The 45◦-line states that a credit contraction reduces the asset price by the same percentage. But
the slope on the right is much steeper in δ, because every loan loss must be met by a multiple
contraction of credit. The capital crunch equilibrium is unstable: given δ∗, a slight deterioration of
loan losses requires a credit contraction to comply with the capital constraint (arrow up); reduced
credit deepens the asset price decline (arrow right); but δ > δ∗ generates new loan losses, which
requires further credit contraction (arrow up). This sets oﬀ a new round of loan losses with further
36In a multi-bank extension, this corresponds to multiple symmetric Nash-equilibria in an interest-setting game,
where the capital constraint causes complementarity: other banks’ reduced lending causes low asset prices and
losses, so that the remaining bank’s lending is thereby constrained. Rajan (1994) studies another form of lending
complementarity, based on reputation. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the complementarity is due to the sequential
service constraint. Note that asymmetric equilibria can be ruled out because household spending – hence the deposits
of each bank – respond identically to the economy-wide price level pt. This is useful, because asymmetric equilibria
would force us to apply bank reserves to the clearing and settlement of asymmetric interbank balances.
37Intuitively, if the market expects that credit is not forthcoming, the asset price falls until loan losses indeed
constrain credit supply. Similarly, if loan losses are expected, then the banking system reduces lending, and the
resulting asset price decline and defaults cause exactly the anticipated loan losses.
19contractionary eﬀects. Loan losses accrue at a faster rate than the capital-compliant contraction
of bank credit can keep up with.
Figure 8: Financial Instability
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This interaction between asset prices and banking distress yields a natural characterization of
ﬁnancial instability as an unstable credit contraction, accompanied by falling asset prices and
mounting loan losses. Financial instability occurs in the space between the unstable capital crunch
and the stable banking crisis equilibria. It materializes whenever δ(τ) > δ∗, which is unavoidable
if fundamentals are suﬃciently poor (τ > τ∗). It comes to a halt only when credit and asset prices
have collapsed in a systemic banking crisis. Although we have encountered this outcome before
(page 16), it now occurs for a whole range of shocks (τ∗,1]. But the real eﬀects are as severe, as
the credit and payment mechanism ceases to function.38
3.3 Vulnerability
We deﬁne vulnerability as the sensitivity of the banking system to falling asset prices. The smaller
the thresholds {τi,δi}, the more vulnerable the banking system to any given decline δ. We now
relate vulnerability to the structural parameters of the economy, {α,β,γ}. The model is well-suited
to explore these comparative statics, as {α,β,γ} can be varied independently of {τ,δ}.
Regarding the structural parameters, recall from (12) that ﬁrm leverage is measured by α, because
higher productivity encourages ﬁrms to purchase more assets and incur more debt qH. The interest
rate equals R = β−1, the inverse rate of time preference of households. Finally, γ measures the
‘deﬂationary tendency’ of the economy: a lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/γ makes
households less willing to increase their spending st to plug the hole in aggregate demand, which
38Note that this outcome of ﬁnancial instability is consistent with the deﬁnition provided in footnote 1.
20attenuates deﬂation in (23)-(24).39
Proposition 5 Balance Sheet Vulnerability
The banking system is more vulnerable to asset price declines in the presence of
• greater leverage (α),
• higher rate of time preference (β),
• greater deﬂationary tendency (γ).
Proof: Appendix 2 shows that greater values of {α,β,γ} lead to smaller thresholds {τi,δi}. 
The result is intuitive. It is the size of loan losses that determines whether a capital crunch,
ﬁnancial instability, or a banking crisis occurs (proposition 4). Greater values of {α,β,γ} translate
any given asset price decline into greater loan losses, the size of which determines the outcome.
Higher leverage (α) and a cheaper ﬁnancing (higher β) both increase asset valuation qH in (11) on
which the decline δ acts. Similarly, higher γ leads to greater deﬂation, given the size of the wealth
eﬀect δqH in (23) and (24). (Meanwhile, the ability to withstand losses, Π and K, falls as we raise
α or β.) Hence, λ(δ) shifts up and precipitates more adverse outcomes; that is, the same outcomes
occur at smaller {τi,δi}.
One interpretation of this result is that highly developed ﬁnancial systems, and low-interest rate
regimes, may be particularly prone to ﬁnancial instability: both factors encourage greater lever-
age.40 These are among the factors Borio and Lowe (2002) identiﬁed as conducive to ﬁnancial
imbalances. To illustrate the importance of leverage, ﬁgure 9 plots δ∗(α) as derived in (28). In
view of proposition 4, this curve is called the ﬁnancial stability frontier.













39At the limit γ → 0, spending is so responsive that the price level remains ﬁxed, pt(τ) = 1. (Any deviation would
evoke inﬁnite (or zero) spending by households, which conﬂicts with market clearing. Hence γ → 0 implies ﬁxed
goods prices.)
40Indicative of this possibility is the frequency of ﬁnancial instability in the aftermath of liberalizations (Kaminsky
and Reinhart 1999).
21The greater leverage, the smaller the asset price decline that causes ﬁnancial instability. Firm
leverage is essential for ﬁnancial instability as it constitutes exposure to asset prices.41 By contrast,
deﬂationary tendency is not essential in our context. It exacerbates vulnerability (γ → 1 ⇒ δ∗ → 0),
but its absence does not guarantee ﬁnancial stability.
4 Policy Implications
We conclude this paper with applications to illustrate possible uses of the model. The model pro-
vides a fresh perspective on central banking policy debates in the areas of monetary and regulatory
policy. The three case studies we include, Japan’s Lost Decade, the Nordic Banking Crises and the
US Great Depression, suggest that the variables we have modeled are relevant in reality.
4.1 Macroeconomic versus Financial Stability
The model distinguishes between macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability. Macroeconomic stability
depends on the parameters governing deﬂation and output (γ and τ). Financial stability, by
contrast, depends on asset prices and loan losses (δ and λ). Macroeconomic and ﬁnancial instability
(MiS and FiS) are distinct concepts. Either one may cause the other; yet while they tend to occur
together, they need not. This can be illustrated by arranging previous results in four cases.
• MiS⇒FiS. In a fundamental equilibrium, causation runs from the economy to the banking
system.42 Only a suﬃciently large macroeconomic shock brings about ﬁnancial instability.
• FiS⇒MiS. In a self-fulﬁlling equilibrium, the causation is reversed: deﬂation (and output
collapse) can occur as a by-product of a self-fulﬁlling capital crunch (and banking crisis).
• MiS alone. A large productivity shock τ may depress output without causing any loan
losses, if leverage (α) and deﬂationary tendency (γ) are suﬃciently low.
• FiS alone. A self-fulﬁlling banking crisis may occur without producing any deﬂation, and
a self-fulﬁlling capital crunch may produce neither deﬂation nor output gap, if γ → 0 and
τ → 0 respectively.
One is led to the conclusion that a policy preventing deﬂation would not necessarily deliver ﬁnancial
stability. Such a policy may be conducive to ﬁnancial stability, as claimed by Schwartz (1995) or
Bordo and Wheelock (1998), but it is not suﬃcient to guarantee it. This helps explain why central
banks treat macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability as distinct, albeit related, concerns. The question
then arises whether a concern with ﬁnancial stability aﬀects the conduct of monetary policy.
41Default is impossible with no leverage. With unit leverage, α = (R−1)/R in (12), ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts match
their debt (RqH = Π); absent deﬂation, not even δ = 1 causes default.
42The unconstrained asset price falls only if future output or price levels do, as in (8). The asset price is aﬀected
independently by bank credit only in a constrained equilibrium, as in (26).
224.2 Monetary Policy and Asset Prices
A widely held view maintains that interest rates should not react to asset prices beyond their
predictive content for future inﬂation (Bernanke and Gertler 1999). A large and abrupt asset price
decline is the main exception considered in policy discussions. But the literature provides little
guidance on how to identify such an exception. Mishkin and White (2003) clarify the debate,
proposing ﬁnancial stability as the decision criterion,
“[...] ﬁnancial instability is the key problem facing the policymaker and not stock market crashes,
even if they reﬂect the bursting of an asset price bubble. If the balance sheets of ﬁnancial and
nonﬁnancial institutions are initially strong, then a stock market crash (bursting of the bubble) is
unlikely to lead to ﬁnancial instability. [...] However, central banks may see the need to directly
respond to a stock market crash when the crash puts stress on the ﬁnancial system in order to
prevent ﬁnancial instability. [...] A focus on ﬁnancial instability also implies that central banks will
respond to disruptions in the ﬁnancial markets even if the stock market is not a major concern.”
Frederic Mishkin and Eugene White (2003) p. 73-74
Our model helps understand their argument, since it explicitly solves for the asset price decline
beyond which ﬁnancial instability sets in. The critical threshold δ∗ was shown to depend on leverage
(ﬁgure 9). Consider two economies that diﬀer only in this measure of balance sheet strength. In the
economy with weak balance sheets (α > 1/2), an asset price decline above 5.5% triggers ﬁnancial
instability. In the economy with strong balance sheets (α < 1/4), it takes a decline of 16% to do
so. The critical asset price decline is a diﬀerent number in diﬀerent economies, depending on the
state of balance sheets.43
Conversely, a sudden asset price decline of 10% causes ﬁnancial instability and a banking crisis in
one case, yet hardly aﬀects the banking system in the other. Given these diverging outcomes, it
is plausible that monetary policy should react only in the former case. This example illustrates
Mishkin and White’s point that monetary policy should react to the threat of ﬁnancial instability,
not to the level of asset prices per se. When the argument is cast in the form of interest rate rules,
this policy would be captured by a ﬂexible threshold term, not by the systematic reaction to asset
price levels examined by Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Cecchetti et al (2000).
Can monetary policy avert ﬁnancial instability? A complete answer requires extensions best left to
future research, but some observations can be made. First, liquidity injections in our context are
inconsequential.44 Second, any successful policy must be timely, carried out in t. Once losses have
materialized, the damage cannot be undone by subsequent monetary easing. An interest rate cut
(Rt < R) supports asset prices only if banks are unconstrained. This policy works in the presence
43Bernanke and Gertler (1999) put forth a similar example (p. 21), but their simulations are conﬁned to the
neighborhood of the steady state (p. 31). Our example uses R = 1.05 and γ = 0 in (28). Neither deﬂation nor
recession is necessary for argument. (A positive deﬂationary tendency (γ > 0) would shift down the locus in ﬁgure 9.)
44The model by construction rules out illiquidity, since money and credit are perfectly elastic, and there is neither
internal nor external drain: agents do not withdraw money; and treating the banking system as a whole obviates the
need to use reserves for interbank clearing and settlement.
23of multiple equilibria if it coordinates the banking system on the better, fundamental equilibrium
(proposition 4). Therefore, a timely interest rate cut might avert ﬁnancial instability provided
fundamentals are not too poor (τ < τ∗).45 Finally, one may also consider preemptive tightening to
prevent a build-up of ﬁnancial imbalances in the ﬁrst place (Borio and Lowe 2002). An increase in
R, if phased in carefully, would indeed reduce leverage and vulnerability, shifting up the ﬁnancial
stability frontier δ∗(α). This view questions the traditional notion that ﬁnancial stability pertains
only to the domain of prudential regulation.
4.3 Regulatory Implications
The model also touches on regulatory issues. First, asset prices were shown to aﬀect the banking
system through borrower default. Hence restrictions on direct asset holding might mitigate, but
cannot eliminate, banks’ eﬀective exposure to asset prices. This is particularly relevant for real es-
tate, the asset modeled in this paper, for its wide-spread use as collateral. Real estate developments
indeed play an increasing role in ﬁnancial stability assessments.46 Second, normal proﬁts buﬀer the
impact of loan losses on bank capital; greater proﬁts are conducive to ﬁnancial stability (they move
up δDiv, hence also δ∗ = RδDiv). The argument that greater proﬁtability reduces the incidence of
bank failure is more familiar from the literature on charter value and risk taking (Keeley 1990).
Third, the model produces ﬁnancial instability as an extreme form of procyclicality.47 Evidence sug-
gests that the procyclicality of the ﬁnancial system may cause ﬁnancial instability (Borio et al 2001).
Bank capital, provisioning, proﬁts and risk assessments all move over the cycle in a way that en-
courages procyclical lending, which may feed boom-bust cycles in credit and asset prices. In the
context of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Goodhart (1995) singles out the role of capital adequacy,
“The asset price cycle was both driven by, and drove, an accompanying cycle in bank credit expan-
sion, and to a somewhat lesser extent in broad money. The collapse of these asset markets after
1990 was associated with a widespread rise in bad debts, in the need for bank provisions and in a
fall in bank proﬁts. In many countries banks either failed, or exhibited considerable distress. Pru-
dential regulations, e.g. the Basel capital adequacy ratios, bit more tightly, and will, to some largely
unquantiﬁable extent, have aggravated the constriction of bank credit.”
Charles Goodhart (1995) p. 293
This quote essentially restates the mechanism we have modelled (ﬁgure 1). Our capital constraint
closely resembles existing capital adequacy requirements (Basel I). Their eﬀect of interacting asset
prices and banking distress can be extremely procyclical, as reﬂected in the feedback leading to
ﬁnancial instability (ﬁgure 8).48
45This may explain why a small temporary rate cut in a crucial moment can have a decisive eﬀect, as in October
1987 and October 1998.
46See International Monetary Fund and World Bank (2003), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), and
various central banks’ Financial Stability Reviews.
47Procyclicality refers to the tendency of the ﬁnancial system to reinforce, and sometimes shape, the business cycle,
where it is understood that the forces in question emanate from the ﬁnancial system.
48Blum and Hellwig (1995) provide macroeconomic model to show that a binding capital requirement increases the
24Yet weaker regulation would not necessarily improve ﬁnancial stability in our context, for several
reasons. With smaller capital requirements, the contraction would set in earlier and with greater
force.49 With no capital requirements, similar results would obtain if banks observed a capital ratio
for reasons other than regulation – it is plausible that regulation merely raises the capital ratio that
banks would otherwise adopt.50 Moreover, our macroeconomic approach ignores risk and incentives
that underpin capital adequacy regulation (see Rochet 1992 for a model), one more reason why
our analysis does not allow to draw the conclusion that capital regulation would be destabilizing
in reality.
More generally, bank capital is not indispensable to the mechanism this paper proposed. The
essential link goes from losses to credit contraction (ﬁgure 1), whether or not this link involves
bank capital. That said, the results need not be conﬁned to banks – mortgage companies, mutual
funds, even individual investors might similarly reduce credit in response to losses.51
5 Case Studies
5.1 Japan’s Lost Decade
Japan’s Lost Decade (1990s) is marked by the bursting of an asset price bubble, and a decade of
banking distress with sluggish growth.52 Models ignoring asset prices and non-performing loans
cannot reasonably explain this experience. The mechanism we have modelled (ﬁgure 1) captures
several aspects of this episode.
The decline in asset prices has been spectacular (large δ): stocks lost almost 70% since their
peak in 1989, residential property lost 30%, and commercial property lost some 60% between 1992
and 2002 (see ﬁgure 10). The urban commercial land price index of 6 large cities declined even by
85% (Ueda 2003, p. 3).
“It has been the deﬂation of asset prices, not that of general prices, that has generated serious
negative eﬀects on the balance sheets of borrowers and, over time, on those of lenders.” p. 2
“The deterioration of balance sheets can be mostly explained by declines in asset prices and by
sensitivity of output and the price level to aggregate demand disturbances. Their model is static and excludes asset
prices and ﬁnancial instability. Estrella (2004) develops a dynamic model of procyclicality.
49A binding capital constraint is destabilizing whenever the coeﬃcient in (29) exceeds one. This is necessarily the
case for deposit banking. In terms of stability, a smaller capital ratio chosen by banks is worse than a higher ratio
chosen by the regulator.
50Other reasons for capital constraints include monitoring incentives (Holmstr¨ om and Tirole 1997, Chen 2001),
market discipline (Calomiris and Wilson 1998), or buﬀer against failure (Gorton and Winton 1995, 2000, Diamond and
Rajan 2000, Bolt and Tieman 2004). Historical evidence suggests a tendency toward self-regulation. Gorton (1985)
shows that private clearinghouses in the US endogenously arose to coordinate and regulate banks (including capital
requirements), long before the system was nationalized. Indeed, capital ratios used to be much higher: the century-
long decline in bank capital ratios is documented in Berger et al (1995), ﬁgure 1.
51For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) propose a model of performance-based arbitrage which, inter alia, implies
that investment reacts to previous losses more than one-for-one.
52See Cargill et al (1997), Hoshi and Kashyap (1999), and Koo (2003).
25non-performing loans (in the case of banks). Moreover, most of the declines in bank lending since
the mid-1990s can be attributed to these two factors, together with the liquidity problems of banks
during 1997-98.”
Kazuo Ueda (2003) p. 4
The sharp decline in asset prices caused a large measure of loan losses to Japanese banks (large λ).
Figure 10 plots asset prices against the number of bankruptcies and realized loan losses. The
substantial and persistent decline in asset prices coincides with a rise in bankruptcies and loan
losses.53
[Figure 10: Japan here]
The often cited ‘non-performing loans problem’ almost completely characterizes the state of the
Japanese ﬁnancial system. Estimates of aggregate non-performing loans for the late 1990s settle
around 7-8% of GDP (Hoshi and Kashyap 1999, Inaba et al 2003). Loan losses exceeded operating
proﬁts every year since 1994.54 In the model this corresponds to λ > (R−1)K, where proposition 4
applies. Importantly, the evidence that real estate-related industries caused the heaviest loan losses
(Hoshi 2001) is consistent with our direction of causality from falling asset prices to the default of
leveraged ﬁrms.55
The non-performing loan problem induced a capital crunch. The liquidation of Jusen companies
during early 1996 had already caused losses to the founder institutions (mostly large banks); the
phasing in of prompt corrective action accelerated write-oﬀs, and focused supervisory attention on
capital ratios.56 Since 1990, issuing new equity had been virtually impossible: given low proﬁtability
and limited access to capital markets, private banks responded by trying to squeeze their asset size
(Nakaso 2001) – as the model suggests. Total bank lending growth fell throughout the decade to
become negative in the late 1990s.57
As falling asset prices impair the balance sheets of both ﬁrms and banks, the question arises whether
the decline in private lending was driven by low demand for loans, as in the ﬁnancial accelerator, or
by constrained supply, as in this model. Both channels have played a role. Koo (2003) emphasized
the fall in demand by ﬁrms attempting to repair their balance sheets, and coined the term “bal-
ance sheet recession” to describe the macroeconomic consequence. The ﬁrm-level panel evidence
53To visualize the percentage decline, the series are expressed relative to their peaks between 1985-92. Loan losses
are ”total losses on disposal of non-performing loans” (FSA), a ﬁgure much smaller than estimates of non-performing
loans. The bankruptcies in the 1990s, although fewer than the 1984 peak, involved far greater liabilities. Bankruptcy
data were kindly provided by Teikoku Databank America, Inc.
54See Figure 9 in Nakaso (2001). The loan losses reported by banks during 1992-99, amount to 13.2 times the
average annual operating proﬁt; it would have taken 13 years for Japanese banks to dispose of loan losses relying
on proﬁts alone (p. 30). Between April 1992 and March 2000, 17% of GDP has been spent on dealing with the
non-performing loans problem (p. 2); the ﬁgure is now approaching 20% (Ueda 2003, p. 4).
55Hoshi (2001) shows that the cross-sectional variation of non-performing loans ratios of Japanese banks is best
explained by the variation in the growth of loans to the real estate industry. The proportion of lending to this industry
amounts to 12% (ﬁgure 6); that to real-estate related industries amounts to 25% (Okina et al 2001, ﬁgure 16).
56PCA allows regulators to intervene in banks that do not comply with risk-based capital adequacy regulation
(Basel I) in force since 1993.
57See Nakaso (2001) ﬁgure 12, and Watanabe (2002) ﬁgure 4.
26of Inaba et al (2003) indeed reveals a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of the debt-asset ratio on ﬁrm
investment. But also the capital ratio of ﬁrms’ main banks was shown to be signiﬁcant, especially
to non-bond issuing ﬁrms. The evidence of a capital crunch is further strengthened by bank-level
evidence showing that both bank capitalization and ﬁrms’ debt-asset ratio “have made large nega-
tive contributions to bank lending” (p. 9). The clearest evidence of a capital crunch points to the
large private banks during ﬁscal year 1997 (Woo 1999, Watanabe 2002).58 This timing is consistent
with the hypothesis that non-performing loans were responsible for the capital crunch.
Capital crunches can be fundamental or self-fulﬁlling (proposition 4). If fundamentals are weak
(τ → τ∗), so is credit demand, and the spread is predicted to be small (see page 42). Hoggarth
and Thomas (1999) note that spreads indeed remained small. Our model then appears to imply
that Japan’s banking distress is fundamental, rather than self-fulﬁlling. In a controversial paper,
Hayashi and Prescott (2002) put forth the view that falling productivity largely explains Japan’s
lost decade. Their hypothesis ﬁts squarely with our model – it would take a permanent fall in
productivity of about 70% in (22) to produce the observed asset price decline, deﬂation having
remained moderate. That would imply such a severe recession as to contradict the actual output
realization. The productivity explanation appears implausible unless the bubble of the late 1980s
was predicated on a vast overestimation of future productivity.
The model also predicts that a capital crunch is an unstable equilibrium. Anecdotal evidence
indeed suggests that the Japanese ﬁnancial system witnessed signs of instability precisely at the
time of the capital crunch in late 1997. As described in Nakaso (2001), the non-performing loans
problem threatened the viability of several major banks (p. 7). When ﬁnancial institutions started
defaulting, a short period of ﬁnancial instability ensued but was contained by the Bank of Japan’s
intervention (p. 9).
In sum, the banking system did not collapse, but it suﬀered a capital crunch due to loan losses
following substantial asset price declines, as illustrated in ﬁgure 1. It is then not surprising that
expansionary policy has long failed to support asset prices and stimulate the economy, since the
expansion was eﬀectively constrained by the state of the banking system.
5.2 The Nordic Banking Crises
The Nordic Banking Crises (1988-1993) suﬀered by Finland, Norway, and Sweden followed a similar
pattern. Rather than recount each episode this brief review highlights the common pattern.59
Systematic deregulation during the 1980s fuelled a rapid credit boom. The rapid increase in
bank lending was initially treated by regulators as a natural adjustment to a new regime (Berg 1998
58Foreign lending by large City Banks saw the steepest decline, a fact exploited by Peek and Rosengren (2000) to
identify an independent loan supply shock in US real estate markets.
59Denmark’s banking problems were of a similar nature, but less severe. The section draws on Vihri¨ al¨ a (1997) for
Finland; B¨ ackstr¨ om (1997) and Englund (1999) for Sweden; Gerdrup (2003) and Moe et al (2004) for Norway. The
countries are analyzed jointly in Berg (1998), Drees and Pazarba¸ sio˘ glu (1998), Pesola (2001), and Hansen (2003).
The data sources are Bank of Finland, Norges Bank and Statistics Norway; Sveriges Riksbank and Statistics Sweden.
27p. 197)60 The concurrent and rapid rise in asset prices was almost exactly reversed in the subsequent
asset price decline.
“Prices of residential and commercial real estate had increased as a result of the growth in bank
lending, and vice versa [...] Real estate prices fell dramatically from their peak levels and trapped
many borrowers in positions where their loans were substantially higher than the market value of their
collateral. When this coincided with higher real rates of interest and economic recession, increased
loan losses to banks were an obvious consequence.” p. 201
“Within a few years after loan growth had peaked, banks began to see heavy losses. Industry-wide
loss provisions amounted to around 3% of total banking assets in 1991 in Norway, in 1992 in Finland,
and in 1993-94 in Sweden. This should be compared to levels of equity capital that averaged only
about 6% of total assets in these three countries.”
Sigbjørn Berg (1998) p. 200
[Figure 10: Finland, Norway, Sweden here]
The timing of ﬁrst banking problems reﬂected country-speciﬁc factors.61 But falling prices across
all asset classes led to wide-spread and correlated default. Figure 10 shows that the number of
bankruptcies during 1990-95 was 3-4 times greater than a decade earlier. Loan losses, as a
consequence, soared to unprecedented levels.62
Finland Norway Sweden
Equity Price (% decline) 67 48 40
Residential Real Estate (% decline) 40 27 21
Commercial Real Estate (% decline) 49 43 71
Loan losses in peak year (% of GDP) 4.4 2.8 3.8
Non-performing loans (% of GDP) 9 9 11
Cumulative bank credit contraction (%) 35.5 4.9 26.4
Sources: BIS asset price data; Sandal (2004) p. 84.63
Some 60-80% of loan losses in the three countries can be attributed to ﬁrms; default rates were
particularly high in the real estate sector.64 The Finnish savings banks, with a traditional con-
centration in real estate, had expanded faster than commercial banks during the boom and, as
the downturn hit the real estate sector, they faced greater losses and contracted credit more than
did commercial banks (Vihri¨ al¨ a 1997 p. 40, 59, 90). The role of real estate was also apparent in
Sweden; although real estate amounted to only 15% of lending, it accounted for 40-50% of loan
60Drees and Pazarba¸ sio˘ glu (1998) catalogued the deregulation measures. They included the abolition of ceilings
on deposit or lending rates, foreign-denominated borrowing, and reserve requirements or placement ratios.
61Norway suﬀered from the sharp decline in oil prices (1986), Sweden from the tightening monetary policy (1990-92),
and Finland from the collapse of the Soviet Union (1990 onward).
62As in the case of Japan, realized loan losses (ﬁgure 10) are smaller than estimates of non-performing loans (table).
63The % declines of asset prices are calculated from peak to trough. The % credit contraction refers to 1991-95
(Finland), 1990-91 (Norway), and 1990-95 (Sweden).
64See Drees and Pazarba¸ sio˘ glu 1998, table 11.
28losses (Englund 1999 p. 90). The Swedish banking crisis was compounded by the sharp rise in
interest rates in defense of the krona’s ERM parity; yet the policy failed to avert a twin crisis. 65
“Looking back, one can see that in the course of the crisis the seven largest banks, with 90% of
the market, all suﬀered heavy losses. In these years their aggregate loan losses amounted to the
equivalent of 12% of Sweden’s annual GDP. The stock of non-performing loans was much larger
than the banking sector’s total equity capital, and ﬁve of the seven largest banks were obliged to
obtain capital contributions form either the state or their owners. It was truly a matter of a systemic
crisis.”
“Rescuing the banking sector was necessary to avoid a collapse of the real economy. [...] The direct
outlays in connection with the capital injection into the banking system added up to just over 4%
of GDP.”
Urban B¨ ackstr¨ om (1997) p. 133-35
Finland and Norway also had to recapitalize their banking systems. Vihri¨ al¨ a (1997) reports that
bad assets of Finnish deposit banks amounted to 8% of total assets in 1990-95, clearly exceeding the
regulatory capital; he argues that ”with losses of this magnitude most if not all banks would have
failed without massive government intervention [of 10% of annual GDP]” (p. 39). The Norwegian
banking system also continued operating with substantial capital injections (Sandal 2004).
The capital injections arguably had a stabilizing eﬀect. Recall that the model predicts that loan
losses beyond a threshold produce ﬁnancial instability, propelling the system toward a banking
crisis with zero credit and autarky (proposition 4). The magnitude of losses in the Nordic banking
systems clearly exceeded this threshold, but the capital injections prevented this theoretical limit
from materializing.66 There were nonetheless indications of a capital crunch in two of the three
countries. In Sweden, where credit contracted by more than 20%, the lending spread rose to 5%
and loan-to-value ratios fell from 90% to 60%, far below the pre-boom level of 75% (Englund 1999
p. 85, 91, 95). In Finland, the depletion of bank capital and the concurrent tightening of capital
regulations also suggest a capital crunch in 1991-92; regressions found especially the link from
non-performing loans to reduced lending to be strong (Vihri¨ al¨ a 1997 p. 55, 161).67
Econometric studies also reveal patterns consistent with the mechanism proposed in our model.
Pesola (2001) found that most of the variation in the number of bankruptcies and loan losses in the
Nordic countries can be explained by the interaction between ﬁnancial fragility (debt/GDP) and
adverse ‘surprises’. Of the latter, increases in the bank loan rate, and the diﬀerence between forecast
and realized output were both signiﬁcant regressors. The inclusion of asset price changes would
likely have further improved the ﬁt. In a related study of the Nordic crises, Hansen (2003) showed
65About 40% of bank borrowing was from abroad. Once the twin crisis occurred, the krona’s devaluation added to
banks’ losses (Englund 1999). Although banks’ direct foreign-exchange exposure was balanced, that of their borrowers
was not. This again reﬂects indirect exposure as examined in the model; it also suggests that the exchange rate plays
a role similar to the other asset prices – both devaluation and asset price decline compromise the ability to repay
ﬁxed nominal debt.
66The interventions are compared in Berg (1998) and Sandal (2004).
67Recall our discussion of page 25. Vihri¨ al¨ a (1997) ﬁnds in his regressions that the aggregate relation between bank
capital and lending is weaker than that between loan losses and lending. The reason is that stronger banks sometimes
expanded lending in a gamble for resurrection, whereas undercapitalized banks were forced to contract (p. 157-61).
29that bankruptcies were less related to the business cycle than to the ‘ﬁnancial cycle’. Bank credit
and house prices were found to Granger-cause bankruptcies (compare ﬁgure 10). In particular,
the joint departure of credit and house prices from their (co-integrating) long-run equilibrium
helped predict bankruptcies. This suggests that ﬁnancial imbalances, in the sense of Borio and
Lowe (2002), were an important feature of the Nordic banking crises.
These results are consistent with the distinction the model draws between macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial instability (section 4.1). For instance, B¨ ackstr¨ om (1997) and Gerdrup (2003) observed
that the 1990s saw more banking distress, yet less macroeconomic instability, than the 1920s and
1930s.68 They attribute this diﬀerence to the greater eﬀect of leverage and asset prices during
the 1990s, although better crisis management and monetary policy may also have played a role.
Proposition 5 makes clear why one should expect this distinction to hinge on ﬁnancial fragility (i.e.
vulnerability).
Overall, the Japanese and Nordic banking crises were driven by the deterioration of bank assets –
no bank runs on any signiﬁcant scale took place. Our model therefore provides a better description
than do microeconomic bank run models. The latter were designed with the Great Depression in
mind, the episode that might well present the toughest test of the relevance of our model.
5.3 The US Great Depression
The US Great Depression (1929-1933) witnessed the collapse of the ﬁnancial system and a depres-
sion unprecedented in scale. The episode exposes an important omission of the model, namely bank
runs. Nonetheless, in providing a coherent story of default and banking distress, the model helps
understand bank runs as a symptom, rather than the cause, of the deterioration of macroeconomic
conditions.
The famous stock market crash of 1929 initiated a prolonged decline of prices. The stock market
(Dow Jones Index) fell by 24% on October 28-29, 1929, and continued its decline until early 1933,
closing more than 80% below its 1929 peak. Real estate prices may have declined by about 50%.69
Also the decline of bond prices is cited by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) as a major source of losses
to banks (p. 355-56). Most famously, price level deﬂation reached a cumulative 27% (consumer
prices), or 38% (wholesale prices).70 The deﬂationary tendency was much more pronounced than
during Japan’s Lost Decade, where cumulative deﬂation reached merely 3% (Ueda 2003).
The consequences to the banking system of the collapse in prices had already been noted with
68In the 1920s, Swedish GDP fell by 18%, and deﬂation reached 30%; in 1990s GDP fell by 6% without deﬂation.
Yet banking distress was more severe in the 1990s (B¨ ackstr¨ om 1997) p. 137). In Norway, although the 1920s saw
both macroeconomic and ﬁnancial instability, the banking distress of the early 1930s appears small compared with
the macroeconomic decline of 8% in 1931 alone (see Gerdrup 2003 p. 30).
69Among the few consistent series are the urban Chicago real estate and land prices of Hoyt (1933).
70These measures cover 1929-1933 peak to trough, using the CPI and WPI of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The agricultural price index also declined throughout this period (Calomiris and Mason 2003, ﬁgure 1), suggesting a
continuation of the 1920s banking distress in the agricultural regions.
30alarm by Keynes (1931). Falling prices produced debt-deﬂation (Fisher 1933) where borrowers,
attempting to reduce their indebtedness by distress selling assets, contributed to the contraction
of money and credit producing further deﬂation. Bernanke (1983) emphasized the generalized
nature of the debt crisis, and argued that it impaired the channels of credit intermediation. His
evidence reﬂects high rates of default in all sectors.71 Default on this scale produced signiﬁcant
loan losses. In line with λ of our model, the best available measure of loan losses is ‘liabilities
of failed businesses’.72 Bernanke (1983) ﬁnds a “powerful negative eﬀect” of this indicator on the
growth of bank loans and industrial production (p. 270).73 Calomiris and Mason (2003) conﬁrm
its signiﬁcance in their disaggregated study of bank failures. This evidence is consistent with high
rates of default leading up to the bank runs.
The evidence on credit rationing and the rising cost of credit intermediation is consistent with
either weak credit demand or constrained supply.74 The contraction of credit can be characterized
as a capital crunch,
“In response to loan losses in the early 1930s, and high costs of raising new capital, banks faced
signiﬁcant pressure from depositors to reduce deposit risk. Banks cut dividends but avoided new
oﬀerings of stock and thus allowed capital to remain low. The primary means to reduce depositor
risk, and thus prevent deposit withdrawals, was the contraction of the supply of loans.”
Charles Calomiris and Berry Wilson (1998) p. 1-2
This response resembles that predicted by our model. However, the economy failed to maintain the
unstable capital crunch equilibrium. Bank runs tipped the balance toward ﬁnancial instability,
ending in the collapse of the banking system in March 1933. The unstable credit contraction,
accompanied by falling asset prices and mounting loan losses, resembles the notion of ﬁnancial
instability illustrated in ﬁgure 8.
Bank runs are nonetheless an important channel that our model omits. The traditional view con-
siders them depositor panics (Friedman and Schwartz 1963). In modelling banking distress without
bank runs, we depart from existing banking crisis theories building on Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
Our focus on banks’ asset-side helps explain what triggered the runs: we view them as a symp-
tom, rather than the cause, of the ongoing deterioration of balance sheets. Even Friedman and
71The ratio of debt service to national income went from 9% (1929) to almost 20% (1932-33). Survey evidence
indicates that rates of default on mortgages of 38%, farm mortgage delinquency rates of 45%, and wide-spread failures
among small business were not uncommon during the early 1930s (Bernanke 1983 p. 260-61).
72We were unable to obtain consistent non-performing loans data directly. Some quantitative indication is given
by the Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, p. 71. It reports a four-fold increase, from 1929 to 1932, in losses
charged oﬀ on loans and discounts of national banks (approximately 2.6% of total loans). I thank Joseph Mason for
suggesting this source.
73Gorton (1988) has also used this indicator to predict the seven banking panics of the National Banking Era
(1863-1914). He writes (p. 241) “Remarkably, the data support the notion of a critical or threshold value of the
liabilities of failed businesses variable, and a threshold value of the perceived risk measure, at the [banking] panic
dates. The seemingly anomalous event of a panic appears to be no more anomalous than recessions.”
74Both explanations emphasize banks’ asset-side rather than their liability-side as in traditional accounts. This
perspective is also supported by the ﬁnding that wholesale price deﬂation Granger-caused both M1 and industrial
production, see Bernanke and Mihov (2000) p. 122. The decline in lending and anecdotal evidence are reported in
Bernanke (1983), table 1 and p. 264-67.
31Schwartz (1963) acknowledged the “drastically weakened capital position of the commercial banks”,
and concede that the deterioration of credit quality may have triggered the bank runs (p. 330 and
356). Detailed evidence is provided by Calomiris and Mason (2003) in the most comprehensive
study on bank failures to date. They show that fundamentals, including losses from loans and
bond holdings, explain most of the incidence of bank failures. Their data (bank-level, local, and
regional) reveal patterns invisible in the aggregates on which Friedman and Schwartz based the
traditional view. Interestingly, the aggregate indicator that best correlates with bank failures is
the liabilities of failed businesses.
Overall, our model is less suited for the Great Depression than for Japan’s Lost Decade and the
Nordic Banking Crises. But it highlights the role of asset prices and loan losses which have received
little attention in both macroeconomics and the microeconomics of banking. The approach, we
believe, can be applied more broadly to boom-bust cycles and other episodes of ﬁnancial distress.75
We close by touching on other empirical implications. The model suggests that credit may be more
closely related to asset prices than to output. The latter relation enjoys mixed success, whereas the
former is rarely tested. But credit and bank capital should be treated as endogenous in regressions,
as both depend on macroeconomic conditions. Hence the single-equation regressions of capital
crunches, such as Bernanke and Lown (1991), may well suﬀer from simultaneity bias. Note also
that causality, normally running from asset prices to bank credit, may reverse once banking distress
and declining asset prices coexist; some evidence of this eﬀect was found by Davis and Zhu (2004).
Another testable implication is the prediction of a spread on bank loans, as detected by Hubbard
et al (2002). Regarding the regulatory policy, one could measure the extent of procyclicality
by estimating the reduction in bank lending in response to loan losses in (29); if this coeﬃcient
exceeds one, ﬁnancial instability is possible once banks become capital-constrained. Regarding
monetary policy, episodes of ﬁnancial distress such as October 1987 and late 1998 might see the
policy rate fall below an estimated Taylor rule based on macroeconomic variables alone. Finally,
we have shown that loan losses can become a decisive macroeconomic variable; incorporating them
in econometric models might lead to more accurate assessments of the risks to ﬁnancial stability
and of the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy.
75On the role of capital crunches over the regular business cycle, see Wojnilower (1980), and Eckstein and
Sinai (1986). On asset prices and credit in predicting banking crises, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Borio
and Lowe (2002). Asset prices are also emphasized by Kindleberger (1996), and by Hunter et al (2003); on real estate
in particular, Herring and Wachter (1999), and Mera and Bertrand (2000) on the Asian crisis. On realized loan losses
in banking crises, see Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).
32Conclusion
This paper links banking and asset prices in a simple monetary macroeconomic model. The eﬀect
of falling asset prices on the banking system is indirect, non-linear, and involves feedback. As long
as borrowers repay, the eﬀect ‘passes through’ the bank balance sheet. However, when borrowers
default, a one-to-one relation between asset prices and bank capital emerges. Once the capital
constraint binds, that relation becomes unstable, and credit and asset prices implode as ﬁnancial
instability leads to a systemic banking crisis.
The case studies show that the model applies to episodes of banking distress associated with asset
price busts, such as Japan’s Lost Decade, the Nordic Banking crises and, to a lesser extent, the
Great Depression. The model’s ability to distinguish between ﬁnancial and macroeconomic stability
sheds new light on the role of asset prices in monetary policy. Moreover, it makes precise the notion
of balance sheet vulnerability and has several regulatory implications.
The characterization of ﬁnancial extremes in a monetary macroeconomic model is, we hope, of
broader interest. However, a complete examination of how ﬁnancial stability concerns aﬀect mon-
etary and regulatory policy must await several extensions, including a treatment of uncertainty, a
system of several banks, and an analysis of optimal interest rate setting.
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New steady state. The goods market clearing conditions from t + 1 onward are always of the form (21),
involving the pairs {st+i,pt+i} but Kt+i = Kt. Connecting successive st+i using the Euler equation (10)
implies a constant price level, hence a new steady state, from t + 1 onward. (The proof of proposition 2
applies.)
Note that the new steady state in t+1 implies an inverse relation between st and st+1: the intertemporal bud-
get constraint derived from (3) is
P∞
i=0 st+i/Ri = RD, and with st+i = st+1 it becomes st+st+1/(R − 1) =
RD, or, in deviations
[st+1 − s] = −(R − 1)[st − s]. (30)







∀i ≥ 0. (31)
This proposed form is equivalent to (10) if the Euler equation holds between t−1 and t. The equivalence also
holds if, instead, any future price level pt+T takes the proposed form. This normalization can be justiﬁed
by requiring that a zero shock leaves the fundamental price level unchanged at p = 1. Since other agents’
spending reverts to old steady state values, pt+1 the new steady state price level equals the old only if
household spending does, p0 = 1 ⇔ s0 = s. The proposed form p0 = (s0/s)
γ
γ−1 satisﬁes this requirement.
Solution. To solve the model we ﬁnd the solution function pt+1(τ), and recover δ(τ) and pt(τ). From (21)
we get st+1 = α(1 − τ)pt+1y −(R − 1)K, and insert it into (31). After using K = αy/R = s, as implied by
(11)-(13), to replace αy and K, we obtain
pt+1 =
 





This equation deﬁnes the solution function pt+1(τ) implicitly.76 Note that pt+1(0) = 1 for any γ, hence
δ(0) = 0, and pt(0) = 1, and the remaining variables also remain in steady state. A unique solution pt+1 (τ)










Clearly γ < 1 is suﬃcient (not necessary) to guarantee p0
t+1 (τ) > 0 on τ ∈ [0,1].
Performing the chain rule on (22) implies δ0 (τ) > 0, because the negative productivity eﬀect outweighs the
weak positive price level eﬀect. Now we use δ(τ) to obtain st (τ) and pt (τ). To go from the ﬁrst line of (20)
to (23), we cancel pty and split RqH into qH + (R − 1)qH. This brings out δqH and (R − 1)(qH − K) =
(R−1)D = s, yielding st = s+δqH. Clearly st > s, since δ0 (τ) > 0. From (31) then follows that p0
t (τ) < 0.
Deﬂation is temporary: since st > 0 requires st+1 < 0 in (30), pt(τ) < 1 requires pt+1(τ) > 1 in (31).
Finally, the lower bound of the price level, pt in (24), is found by substituting pty = st from (20) into (31) to
obtain pt = (pty/s)
γ/(γ−1)
. Solving for pt and replacing s = αy/R yields pt, and st = pty follows. We then
ﬁnd pt+1 by writing (30) as st+1 = Rs − (R − 1)st, and using it in (31) to obtain
pt+1 =








after replacing st = s(R/α)1−γ. 
76Explicit solutions can be found for speciﬁc values, e.g. γ = 1/2 and 2 admit quadratic solutions.
402. Thresholds
Existence. The thresholds are critical values of λ, which is driven by δ, which is in turn driven by τ. The
thresholds are found as follows,
λ turns positive when: ω = Π → δ0 → τ0
λ eliminates bank dividends: λ = (R − 1)K → δDiv → τDiv
λ eliminates bank capital: λ = RK → δK → τK.
(32)
Examining the extremes shows that interior thresholds exist. At one extreme ω(0) = 0, so no one bears a
loss when τ = 0 (hence τi,δi > 0). At the other extreme ω(1) > RK + Π, so τ = 1 implies losses exceeding
the ﬁrms’ and banking system’s combined ability to withstand them (hence τi,δi < 1).77 By continuity,
there exist thresholds, ordered 0 < τ0 < τDiv < τK < 1, which delimit the four regions of ﬁgure 5.


















where the constant δ∗ is deﬁned for later use. Only δ0 is implicitly deﬁned by ω (δ0) = Π using (23).
Thresholds τi. The fundamental shock can be backed out from (22) written as 1 − τi = (1 − δi)/pt+1,
using δi found above. This yields explicit τi when pt+1 = pt+1 (which is independent of τ). To simplify
notation, we use δ∗ to express δDiv = δ∗/R, δK = δ∗/R+(R − 1)/R, and pt+1 = (1 − δ∗)
γ/(γ−1). Thus, the
thresholds τi are given by
1 − τDiv = (1 − δ∗/R)/(1 − δ∗)
γ/(γ−1)
1 − τ∗ = (1 − δ∗)
1/(1−γ) (33)
1 − τK = (1 − δ∗)
1/(1−γ) /R.
There are no explicit solutions for δ0 and τ0 (unless one assigns γ a number). Since δ0 < δDiv, it follows that
τ0 ∈ (0,τDiv).
Vulnerability. To show that the thresholds in (33) are decreasing in {α,β,γ}, note ﬁrst that δ∗ is. In each
case of (33), τi and δ∗ are related positively. Since all τi depend on α only through δ∗, it follows that τ0
i(α) < 0.
Also τ0
i(β) < 0 is easily shown, since the presence of R = β−1 increases the right of (33), further reducing
τDiv,τK. We also have τ0
i(γ) < 0, because apart from reducing δ∗, γ also raises the exponents in (33). The
remaining threshold is implicitly deﬁned by ω (δ(τ0),pt(τ0)) = Π. Using steady state relations, the diﬀerence
can be written as δ(τ0)α/(R −1)+α−pt(τ0) = 0, where the left is increasing in τ0. Hence, raising α and β
(lowering R) decreases the τ0 necessary for the equality to hold. Similarly, raising γ reduces τ0, because it
raises δ(τ) and pt(τ) for any τ. Therefore, the greater {α,β,γ}, the smaller all thresholds τi. 
3. Capital-Constrained Equilibria
Asset price declines. The capital crunch and the banking crisis are ﬁxed points of (26), where the asset
price decline (hence credit demand) coincides with the contraction required by the capital constraint (hence
credit supply). They can only occur when λ > (R − 1)K, so the goods market solution (24) obtains,





77To show ω (1) > RK + Π, note that δ (1) = 1 and pt(1) = pt ≤ 1 for any γ. Therefore, (17) implies ω(1) > qH.
To show qH > RK + Π, use ﬁrm leverage (12) to replace Π =
1−α
α (R − 1)qH, and use bank leverage (13) to replace
qH = A = RK/(R − 1). Canceling RK, the inequality becomes (R − 1)
−1 > 1 + (1 − α)/α, which holds since
α > (R − 1). Therefore, ω(1) > RK + Π for all α and γ considered.
78When Rt > R, the banking system earns a spread on all lending. As proﬁts are paid out as dividends, Divt+1
increases by (Rt − R)qtH. This leaves the goods market unaﬀected, because new ﬁrms’ spending is reduced by the









λ(δ) − (R − 1)K

if (R − 1)K ≤ λ ≤ RK
qH if λ ≥ RK.
The ﬁrst line never binds, as explained. The third line deﬁnes the systemic banking crisis with δ = 1. The
second line deﬁnes the capital crunch. Using (17) and (24) yields (29), that is, δ = R[(R − 1)K + Π −
(1 − (R/α)−γ)y]/(qH). Upon replacing the ratios with those in (11)-(13), we obtain δ∗ in (28).
Fundamentals. The declines δ = 1 and δ∗ are fundamental if τ = 1 and τ∗, respectively (using (22) as in
appendix 2). However, any τ < 1 allows δ = 1, and any τ < τ∗ also allows δ = δ∗ as self-fulﬁlling equilibria,
while Rt > R is determined by (27). By contrast, any τ > τ∗ implies δ(τ) > δ∗, which can satisfy (26) only
if δ = 1. (Finally, τ < τ∗ also admits the fundamental equilibrium of proposition 2, since (26) does not
bind.)
Interest rate spread. The banking system’s dividend policy implies Kt+i = Kt, hence the capital
constraint binds permanently if it binds in t. The constrained asset price therefore remains constant
after t, and (27) becomes qtH = α(1 − τ)pt+1y/(Rt − 1). Dividing by qH = αpy/(R − 1) and using
pt+1 = (1 − δ∗)
γ/(γ−1) allows to solve for the loan rate as
Rt − 1
R − 1






In a fundamental equilibrium, particular fundamentals {τ∗,1} bring about the declines {δ∗,1}, while Rt = R.
By contrast, in a self-fulﬁlling equilibrium, a particular loan rate Rt(τ) brings about {δ∗,1}, while τ < τ∗.
Accordingly, we have following equilibria,
Characterization Capital Crunch Banking Crisis Both
fundamental 1 − τ∗ = (1 − δ∗)




1−τ∗ Rt → ∞ τ < 1
in both cases δ = δ∗ δ = 1 pt,st.
The spread provides a measure of the degree to which a capital crunch equilibrium is self-fulﬁlling. This is
why the spread is decreasing in τ: better fundamentals are associated with a larger spread. One can think
of 1−τ as the strength of the economy (hence credit demand), and 1−τ∗ as the state of the banking system
(with capital-constrained credit supply). The ratio (1 − τ)/(1 − τ∗) then measures the relative inadequacy
of credit supply; the spread is smallest when τ → τ∗, because credit demand is as depressed as credit supply,
and it is greatest when a self-fulﬁlling capital crunch occurs despite strong fundamentals τ → 0. 
same amount: the spread is a transfer.
42Figure 10: Asset Prices, Bankruptcies and Loan Losses
Sources: BIS asset price database; Teikoku Databank America, Inc; and Financial Services Agency, Japan.
All graphs express the asset price series relative to their peaks between 1985-92. 
The number of corporate bankruptcies was kindly provided by Teikoku Databank America, Inc. 
Bankruptcies and loan losses relate to the right scale (rs).
Loan losses are "total losses on disposal of non-performing loans" in billions of Yen, and comprise large banks (city banks, 
long-term credit banks, and trust banks) since 1992 (table 4).
Sources: BIS asset price database; Bank of Finland. 
Loan losses and the number of corporate bankruptcies are again measured on the right scale. 
Loan losses are in millions of Finnish markka, net of subsequent recoveries, and are recorded at banking group level 

























































































































































































Equity Residential Commercial Bankruptcies # (rs) Loan Losses (rs)Sources: BIS asset price database; Norges Bank, and Statistics Norway.
All graphs express the asset price series relative to their peaks between 1985-92. 
Bankruptcies and loan losses relate to the right scale.
The number of bankruptcies include both corporate and personal, as recorded by the Register of Bankruptcies.
Loan losses are in millions of Norwegian krone, and comprise realized loan losses, net of recoveries, by commercial 
and savings banks operating in Norway (excluding branches abroad, but including foreign banks).
Sources: BIS asset price database; Sveriges Riksbank, and Statistics Sweden.
The number of bankruptcies reported by Statistics Sweden includes limited liability companies and small firms.
Loan losses are in millions of Swedish krona, and comprise realized loan losses net of recoveries for all banks 
(including savings and cooperative banks)
As for the other Nordic countries, loan losses are not converted to a common currency because the devaluations of 1992































































































































































Equity Residential Commercial Bankruptcies # (rs) Loan Losses (rs)